If you ask which Southeast Asian country has the greater offshore wind resource, the answer is clear: the World Bank estimates Vietnam's technical potential at about 600 GW compared to roughly 178 GW for the Philippines. However, when you ask which country is actually better prepared to start construction in this decade, the answer is the other way around. This discrepancy — between the scale of the resource and the readiness to take advantage of it — is precisely the story of offshore wind in the region at the present time. [1][4]
| Philippines | Vietnam | |
|---|---|---|
| Technical potential | ~178 GW (World Bank) | ~600 GW (World Bank) |
| Route to market | GEA-5 — first offshore-wind-only auction, 3.3 GW | State-owned / military-run pilot proposed; foreign role undefined |
| Timeline | Bidding Dec 2026; delivery 2028–2030 | 6 GW target slipped from 2030 to 2031–2035 |
| Foreign ownership | Up to 100% of renewables (opened 2022) | Not yet defined for offshore wind |
| Readiness signal | Auction terms tie developer duties to government progress on ports, grid and permitting | Maritime spatial planning and core regulations still being written |
The Philippines: procedurally ahead
The Philippines has carried out the dull task of turning ambition into actual projects. In 2022 it allowed full foreign ownership in the renewables sector and has since launched GEA-5, its first auction exclusively for offshore wind, with a capacity of 3.3 GW, bidding to take place in December 2026 and operation to begin between 2028 and 2030. Most importantly, the auction's terms of reference aim to match the commitments that developers must make with the obligations that the government agrees to fulfil regarding ports, transmission and permitting — an unusually frank recognition that these projects are just as much dependent on the government's side of the equation as on the developer's. [2][3][5]
That doesn't ensure that turbines will end up in the water, since the grid reinforcement and the port upgrades still need to be carried out, and the first auction is merely the starting signal, not the end of the process. However, a developer can currently identify a well-defined route to market, hold a clear position in terms of ownership, and have a set timetable. In the case of offshore wind, this kind of clarity is in fact a kind of readiness.
Vietnam: the bigger prize, the slower clock
Vietnam's resource is in a different league, and its long-term ambition is real. Yet the near-term picture is cautious. In the latest draft revision of its national power plan, PDP8, the 6 GW offshore wind target has been pushed from 2030 to the 2031–2035 window. The Ministry of Industry and Trade has proposed that a small number of state-owned or military-run corporations pilot the first projects, and the rules a foreign investor would need — pilot programmes, seabed surveys, investor-selection and in-principle approval processes — are still being drafted. Maritime spatial planning remains unresolved, and the Prime Minister has publicly framed nuclear power as more feasible than offshore wind for 2030. [1]
That implies that for a foreign developer or investor the market offers tremendous potential but at the moment there is no clearly defined way into it. Although the gigawatts are real, the path to them has not yet been established.
What it means — for investors and developers
- In the short term, readiness is more important than potential; the nearer opportunity is not the greater resource. For projects that need to reach financial close this decade, the Philippines is at the moment the more attractive entry point.
- Vietnam remains a position rather than a project; it offers patient capital the opportunity to develop relationships and readiness at the moment, while at the same time waiting for regulatory clarity and a clearly defined route for foreign investors so that scale can be achieved.
- You should support the state, not merely the site. In each of the two markets the binding constraints are governmental — related to spatial planning, the ports, grid connection and ownership rules. The care taken to assess the government's delivery route is just as important as the wind resource.
- Entering the execution gap. The winners will take the lead when the route is clear and will create optionality as it is emerging — exactly the same capital-risk-capability calculation that underlies each major build in the area.
As we argued in Catching the Wind, Southeast Asia's offshore moment will be decided less by the resource than by the execution beneath it. Vietnam and the Philippines are the clearest illustration yet: same ocean, same ambition, very different readiness. Ezra & Macquarie help investors and developers read that readiness — market entry, bankability, grid-connection and delivery strategy across both. See how we help on energy & sustainability →
Sources
- Reccessary — “Vietnam postpones 6 GW offshore wind goal to 2031–2035; state enterprises to pilot”.
- Reccessary — “Philippines, Vietnam advance offshore wind with new auction and capital rules”.
- offshoreWIND.biz — “Philippines Sets New Timeline for Recalibrated Offshore Wind Auction, Targets December 2026 Bidding”.
- The Manila Times — “The next frontier: Offshore wind power” (World Bank technical-potential estimates).
- Watson Farley & Williams — “2026 Update: Offshore Wind in the Philippines” (foreign-ownership and auction framework).
Part of the Ezra & Macquarie wind series, and of our Insights on where capital, risk and capability are moving across Asia. Potential figures are World Bank technical-potential estimates.
